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Article 5

CHEVRON'S FOUNDATION
Mark Seidenfeld*
This Article addresses the question of how a court can justify deferring to
an administrativeagency interpretationof a statute under the Chevron doctrine given the accepted understanding that Article III of the Constitution
makes the judiciary the ultimate decider of the meaning of law in any case or
controversy that is properly before a court. It further considers the ramifications
of the answer to that question on the potentialforms that any doctrine of interpretive deference may assume.
This Article first rejects congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies as the basis for Chevron. It argues that such intent is an
unsupportablefiction that distractsattentionfrom judicialresponsibilityfor the
Chevron doctrine. Instead, it posits that Chevron is better viewed as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint under the courts' Article III responsibilities. It
then analyzes how this view of Chevron might influence when and how the
doctrine should operate.
INTRODUCTION

How can a court justify deferring to an administrative agency
interpretation of a statute under the Chevron' doctrine given the
accepted understanding that Article III of the Constitution makes the
judiciary the ultimate decider of the meaning of law in any case or
controversy that is properly before a court? That is the question this
© 2011 Mark Seidenfeld. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State University
College of Law. I would like to thank all of my colleagues at FSU who participated
when I workshopped this Article here, and in particular Brian Galle, Tara Grove, and
Jim Rossi for their insightful comments. I would also like to thank the faculty at the
University of Tulsa, where I also presented this Article. Finally, I am especially
indebted to my research assistant, Jesse Unruh, for his dedication in tracking down
research leads and providing a sounding board off of which I bounced many an idea.
1 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Article addresses. 2 It further considers the implications of the answer
on the potential forms that any doctrine of interpretive deference may
assume.
Several commentators have addressed what political theory best
justifies the administrative state. 3 This normative question has ramifications for the Chevron doctrine. In particular it provides insights
about the circumstances in which it is preferable for the court to defer
to an agency interpretation. It also provides guidance about how to
structure any deference doctrine to maximize its benefits. 4 For example, a theory based on pluralism would justify a court demanding
agency procedures to ensure that all affected groups are represented
in the process, but then deferring to an agency interpretation as long
as the agency remained within the bounds of its statutorily authorized
power. 5 Alternatively, a theory based on deliberative democracy
might justify a court deferring on a legal question when the agency
has sufficiently deliberated about its reading of the law.6
It is imperative, however, to distinguish the normative question
about what political theory best justifies the administrative state from
the positive question of how, under any such theory, a court canjustify
"ducking" what would seem to be its responsibility to provide a definitive interpretation of a statute. The positive question, being one of
how the courts can forfeit what seems to be a constitutional responsibility, is prior to the normative one. The normative question arises
2 I am not the first to inquire into the tension between Chevron and the statement in Marbuy v. Madison,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803), that it is the province
of the courts to say what the law is. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983) (contending that delegation of
lawmaking to an agency includes within it the power to interpret the statute authorizing that power); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589-98 (2006) (advocating the abandonment of judicial
primacy in the interpretive process in light of the legal realist recognition that statutory interpretation involves policymaking). As will become clear, I do not find prior
reconciliations of the tension persuasive.
3 See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 1-35 (1988); Steven P.
Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 31 -86 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1541-43 (1992); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Hp~kv. L. REV. 1667, 1805-13 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 59-64 (1985).
4 Questions relating to the optimal structure of the Chevron doctrine too are
ones that I have previously addressed. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes,
73 TEX. L. RE,. 83 (1994).
5 See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1671-76.
6 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1548-49.
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only after the positive question has been answered, and that answer
will constrain the permissible responses to the normative question.
Those who elide the constitutional question thus subject themselves to
criticism that, whatever the attractiveness of their normative prescription for Chevron, their prescription may be constitutionally untenable.
At least one scholar has proposed a pragmatic understanding of Chevron that conflates the two questions, thereby advocating that Chevron
apply only when a hodgepodge of factors reflecting disparate theoretical levels of inquiry are satisfied. 7 By treating constitutional justifications and policy considerations on an equal footing, this
understanding forfeits any potential to explain how the factors that
bear on this question should fit together in resolving it.
Perhaps such confusion by scholars is excusable given that the
Supreme Court's expositions on the bounds of the Chevron doctrine
do not distinguish the positive question of the constitutional basis for
Chevron from the normative question of what the Chevron doctrine
should look like. I contend that the failure to maintain such a distinction has led to much of the uncertainty about the applicability of Chevron under Supreme Court precedent.
This Article argues that the foundation for the Chevron doctrine is
anchored in the separation of powers as manifested by the structure
of the Constitution and Article III's assignment of the judicial powers.
In so anchoring Chevron, this Article rejects the common assumption
that the foundation is in an implicit statutory prescription and the
intent-based inquiry to which this assumption leads. Instead, it contends that the foundation is best viewed as a soft constitutional norm
that, to the extent possible under our constitutional structure, encourages courts to refrain from dictating outcomes in policy-laden decisions. The norm is "soft" in that it does not mandate an absolute
constitutional ban on courts relying on policy to resolve issues of statutory interpretation. Rather it is a self-imposed constraint meant to
create barriers against a court reading a statute to effectuate what its
judges believe (either explicitly or implicitly) to be the best policy
available when an appropriate alternative institution also bears
responsibility for interpreting the statute. Thus, this Article sees Chevron as a doctrine similar to the resistance norms that scholars have
identified in other areas as a means of making it more difficult for
Congress to act in a manner that compromises constitutional values
even though the courts and these scholars all agree that Congress can

7

See EvanJ. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1271, 1275 (2008).
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compromise such values so long as it does so in clear and unmistakable language. 8
This Article begins by addressing claims that congressional intent
to have courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes is the most
satisfactory constitutional mooring for the Chevron doctrine. 9 Concluding that the evidence of such intent is scant, the Article proposes
its alternative-that the doctrine is a judicially self-imposed constraint
to assuage concerns about the court's countermajoritarian role under
the Constitution. Finally, the Article discusses the implications that
follow from this alternative foundation.
I.

CRACKS IN THE INTENT-BASED FOUNDATION OF CHEVRON

Assuming that Congress has the power to mandate that courts

defer to agency statutory interpretation, 10 a question remains whether
Congress has mandated such deference, and if so, under what circumstances.1 1 Currently, the legal foundation for Chevron, to the extent
that the Supreme Court and scholars have addressed it, rests on an
8 The best known value protected by resistance norms is federalism. See Ernest
A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1549, 1552 (2000) (coining the phrase "resistance norm" for a
doctrine meant to discourage but not ban government action that impinges on constitutionally recognized interests); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991)
(interpreting the ADEA to exclude state judges from protection against mandatory
retirement because state sovereignty concerns required that any interference with
states' prerogatives about retention ofjudges must be clearly stated in the Act); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (holding that abrogation of
state immunity from suit in federal court under the Fourteenth Amendment requires
a clear statement by Congress).
9 There is a potential question of whether there are constitutional limits on Congress dictating to courts how to go about interpreting statutes, which could have a
bearing on Congress's authority to mandate that courts defer to an agency interpretation of a statute that the agency administers. Regardless of the answer to that question, that I find little support for the proposition that Chevron flows from statutory
prescription, see infra Part I, obviates my need to discuss constitutional limitations had
Congress in fact attempted to mandate Chevron deference.
10 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. RFv. 2085, 2086-88 (2002) (defending the generally accepted view that Congress can tell courts how to interpret statutes); see also infra note 84 (discussing limits
on Congress's power to dictate methods of interpretation). But see Linda D. Jellum,
"Which Is to Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate
Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. Rrv. 837, 897-98 (2009) (arguing that there are
limits to Congress's power to enact "statutory directives").
11 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1159-61 (tracing Justice Scalia's and Justice Breyer's perspectives on
the mandated deference).
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intentionalist theory of statutory interpretation. 12 The Court and
these scholars purport to find, in the assignment of certain administrative tasks to agencies, a congressional intent that in some circumstances agencies are to exercise interpretive primacy over statutes that
13
they administer.
There are at least three variations of the intent-based justification
for Chevron. The Supreme Court set out its current understanding
most explicitly in its United States v. Mead Corp.14 opinion, which relies
on congressional intent to authorize an agency to act with the force of
15
law, but sees a broad array of factors as manifesting this intent.
Among scholars, Tom Merrill has most directly addressed the question of Chevron's foundation, and has also proposed that Chevron
applies in reviewing agency action that Congress intended to have the

12 Not all scholars have accepted the intentionalist foundation for Chevron. See,
e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 269-70 (1988); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure andJudicialDeference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 612, 623-27 (1996); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis,
85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2235-37 (1997). But, currently, the consensus of scholars seems to
support the intentionalist foundation. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2637, 2642-43 (2003); see also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2589 (noting
that consensus has developed that Chevron "turns on congressional will"). Even most
who recognize the fictitious nature of presumed congressional intent regarding Chevron deference nonetheless preface that deference on whether, within a particular statutory context, it is reasonable for courts to assume that Congress would have intended
Chevron deference. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 370 (1986) (asserting that even pre-Chevron the fiction
of legislative intent about agency authority to interpret statutes allows judges to defer
to agency interpretations when they believe deference is appropriate in light of institutional competence); Manning, supra, at 617-18 (presuming that Congress would
intend agencies rather than courts make any policy determinations necessary to interpret a statute); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 593, 621-22 (2008) (advocating Chevron deference when a
decision was sufficiently major to have prompted some congressional attention to the
precise interpretive issue facing the agency).
13 By interpretive primacy, I do not mean to suggest that courts must defer to all
agency interpretations, but rather only that within certain bounds courts must defer
to agency interpretations of statutes. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 817 (2008) (distinguishing
between the courts' role of deciding at step one of Chevron and overseeing agency
decisions at step two of Chevron).
14 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
15 Id. at 226-31.
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force of law. 1 6 Unlike the Supreme Court, however, he finds a narrower set of circumstances in which a statute evidences such intent.
John Duffy also invokes the force of law touchstone for Chevron, but
has proposed the narrowest intent-based foundation; he would apply
Chevron only to interpretations included in agency legislative rulemaking.17 All three intent-based expositions, however, suffer from a paucity of evidence of relevant congressional intent, and all three fail to
shore up their proposed foundations adequately in light of the
implausibility of actual congressional intent.
A.

Implausibility of CongressionalIntent

By most accounts, Congress does not directly address the question of which institution-agency or court-is authorized to fill gaps
or resolve ambiguities in the vast majority of regulatory statutes. 18 In
that sense, congressional intent about interpretive primacy is a fiction. 19 One might contend that by failing to attend to this issue Congress implicitly means to give agencies primary responsibility for
clarification of statutory meaning when the statute assigns agencies
the responsibility to make decisions that require resolving statutory
gaps and ambiguities. But, prior to Chevron, Congress legislated
against a background understanding that the courts have ultimate
judicial responsibility to say what the law is. 20 Thus, this contention is
21
difficult to maintain for pre- Chevron statutes.
For post- Chevron statutes, the contention is still difficult to support because Congress specifically provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA): "To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
22
law, [and] interpret.., statutory provisions ....
Hence, even statutes enacted post-Chevron would seem to be bound by Congress vest16 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2097, 2171-75 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 837 (2001).
17 SeeJohn F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 189-207 (1998).
18 See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup.
CT. REV. 201, 212.
19 See Breyer, supra note 12, at 370; William Funk, Faith in Texts-Justice Scalia's
Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution:Apostasy for the Rest of Us?, 49 ADMIN. L. REv.
825, 841-48 (1997); Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245,
2379 (2001); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law,
1989 DuE LJ. 511, 517.
20 See Manning, supra note 12, at 621-25.
21 See id. at 625.
22 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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ing ultimate interpretive authority in the reviewing court, unless the
statute explicitly specified that the agency was to have such authority.
Virtually no statutes do so.
B.

Inadequacy of Attempts to Shore Up Ephemeral CongressionalIntent

The Supreme Court has provided the most amorphous notion of
intent-a notion that would justify invoking Chevron in a larger class
of cases than would competing conceptions. Its most explicit exposition occurs in United States v. Mead Corp.,23 a confusing, 24 and I think
confused, opinion. Mead speaks of actual congressional intent to
authorize an agency to act with the force of law as a proxy for intent to
designate the agency as the primary interpreter of ambiguous statutes. 25 The Court never precisely defines force of law, but implies that
it involves binding those other than the parties to the particular proceeding that is being reviewed. 26 The Court does not clarify what
counts as binding-in particular, whether precedential effect is sufficient. More significantly, on the question of the Court's conception
of congressional intent, Mead indicates that a host of factors are relevant, several of which have no direct relation to intent either to imbue
agency action with force of law or to specify that courts defer to rea27
sonable agency interpretations of statutes they administer.
First, the Court placed great weight on the procedures that Congress required for the agency to act.2 8 The Court went so far as to
suggest Chevron safe harbors when agencies are required by statute to
29
engage in formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
But procedures do not affect the "force of law" of an action if that
term refers in any sense to the binding effect of the action on either
the agency or the public. For example, there is no difference in the
legal impact of an agency order issued after formal adjudicatory procedures and an order issued after informal adjudicatory procedures.3 0
Parties must comply with either order or face an enforcement action
23 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
24 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 347, 347-49 (2003).
25 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
26 See id. at 229-32.
27 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE LJ. 549, 563 (2009)
(illustrating how the factors on which Mead focuses can lead courts to defer less to
agency interpretations than Congress may have actually intended).
28 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
29 See id. at 230 n.12.
30 See Vermeule, supra note 24, at 349.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86: I

in court, and both forms of adjudication can create precedent from
which an agency cannot depart without explanation for why it chooses
not to follow such precedent. 3 1 Similarly, legislative rules issued without formal or notice-and-comment procedures, such as those issued
pursuant to the good cause exception in § 553 of the APA, carry no
less legal weight than those adopted by more thorough or formal
32
procedures.
The Mead Court also concluded that Congress would not intend
33
It
that multiple officials have the power to act with the force of law.

is not clear, however, why this need be so. In fact there are circumstances where Congress clearly means to give many officials authority
to act with the force of law. For example, agencies can have many
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), and numerous statutes authorize
ALJs to make initial decisions in formal adjudications. 34 Those decisions become final and have the same legal impact as a decision of the
agency head unless they are explicitly superseded by action of the
35
agency head.
If Mead is confused, the Supreme Court's later decision in Barnhart v. Walton3 6 is downright perverse when viewed with a focus on
congressional intent. Barnhartused factors that the Court had previously identified as relevant under the doctrine of Skidmor0 7 deference
31 See 2 RPcARjD J.
2002).

PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE

817-20 (4th ed.

32 AsJustice Scalia points out in his Mead dissent, procedures usually are seen as a
means of developing an adequate factual record to justify an action, not a factor
related to questions of statutory interpretation. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
33

See id. at 233 (majority opinion).

34 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (noting that an AL's recommendation may
become the final order of the agency if there are no exceptions filed with the
National Labor Relations Board); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535
U.S. 743, 759 (2002) ("The ALJ's ruling subsequently becomes the final decision of

the FMC unless a party, by filing exceptions, appeals to the Commission or the Commission decides to review the ALJ's decision . . . ."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (2010) (noting that initial determinations by an ALJ regarding Social Security may be reviewed by
other ALJs).
35 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2006) (authorizing initial decisions of ALJs pursuant to
the APA to become the final decision of the agency if the agency does not decide the
case itself).

36 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
37 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("[The Court] consider[s) that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of [an] [a]dministrator under
[an] Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of administrator under [an]
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority; do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may prop-

erly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
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to decide whether Chevron applied.3 8 Those factors included the care
the agency took in issuing its interpretation,3 9 which cannot relate to
congressional intent because Congress passed the statute before the
agency acted.
The confusion in the Supreme Court opinions and the Court's
reliance on factors unrelated to actual congressional intent are best
explained by positing that, despite the language in Mead focusing on
actual intent, Mead really depends on constructive congressional
intent about whether the agency should get interpretive primacy.
This is supported explicitly by several passages in Mead. For example,
the Court discusses statutory circumstances that indicate "Congress
would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when
it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law,
even one about which 'Congress did not actually have an intent as to a
particular result.' "40 The Court also alludes to Chevron resting on a
presumption of congressional intent. 41 Thus, Mead and Barnhart are
much less confusing if they are seen as relying on the court determining not what Congress intended, but rather on factors that would
make it reasonable for Congress to have intended that agencies enjoy
42
interpretive primacy.
Nonetheless, the shift from actual to constructive intent in Mead
is problematic. If Mead instructs judges at step zero of Chevron to
determine whether it would be reasonable for Congress to have
expected the agency to have interpretive primacy, then there is no
actual assignment of that responsibility to the agency and the intentbased foundation for Chevron deference crumbles.
The legal foundation for Chevron depends on the existence of a
constitutional justification for the judiciary to avoid its responsibility
in any case where interpretation of the law is necessary to the outdepend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.").
38 See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
39 See id.
40 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)).
41 See id. at 230 n.l1.
42 That Mead is premised on constructive intent is further supported by the frank
recognition byJustice Breyer, who joined the Mead majority, that congressional intent

with respect to agency interpretive primacy is a fiction. See Stephen Breyer, OurDemocratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 267 (2002). Justice Scalia premises much of

his dissent on the fact that Mead deviated from Chevron's presumption about agency
primacy by purporting to look for actual intent. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-40 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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come. The factors that Mead uses in surmising whether Congress
would have expected agencies to exercise interpretive primacy implicitly assumes a Congress acting to promote the public interest. But this
is problematic because in reality Congress is quite different from such
a hypothetical legislative body. The Mead and Barnhart Courts posit
that Congress would want to grant agencies interpretive primacy when
the agency uses procedures that promote deliberation and manifest
care in exercising its interpretive discretion. 43 Such factors plausibly
may help ensure that the agency interpretation is one likely to best
serve the overall interests of the nation. But if political scientists are
to be believed, Congress does not act as a unified body attempting to
best serve some notion of the public interest. Instead, legislation
reflects the preferences of individual members who seek to placate
interest groups and organized constituents that are most likely to
affect the members' reelection. 4 4 Thus, one would expect that Congress's preference for granting an agency interpretive primacy would
depend on factors such as the pragmatic influence of the legislature
over an agency both absolutely and relative to the influence of the
president, the importance of the issues the agency addresses to powerful interest groups, and even the precise issue of interpretation that
the agency faces. 45 Were Congress actually to focus on the choice of
institution to which ultimate interpretive responsibility should be
given, it is most likely that the choice would depend on political factors that the Supreme Court has not recognized in determining
whether to defer to an agency interpretation of its authorizing statute.
The factors are probably so complex and nuanced that the Court cannot identify what would realistically drive the congressional choice
between agency and courts, and even if it could, the factors are likely
to be so blatantly political, even partisan, that the Court could not
legitimately rely on them for deciding whether deference was
appropriate.
Hence, the Court has fallen back on a set of factors that reflect a
judicial presumption about when a hypothetical nonpolitical Congress would have intended to give interpretive primacy to the agency.
43
44
TATION

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION

88-93 (2d ed. 2006); MORRIS P. FIORINA,

AND STATUTORY INTERPRE-

CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASH-

120 (2d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
115-16 (2d ed. 2004); cf. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC
OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 267-69 (1990) (explaining why legislators' interest in
reelection will, in some cases, lead to enactment of legislation that serves the interest
INGTON

ESTABLISHMENT

ELECTORAL CONNECTION

of the general public).
45

See Garrett, supra note 12, at 2648-51.
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Essentially, this "constructive intent" involves a judicial detennination
that it would be a good idea, in terms of the Court's conception of the
public interest, for Congress to have relieved the courts of that
responsibility in those circumstances identified by Mead as warranting
Chevron deference. Thus, the Court's reliance on constructive intent
is inconsistent with the principle underlying the intent-based justification for Chevron that Congress, rather than the judiciary, actually
assigns interpretive primacy to the agency.
Tom Merrill and his coauthors, Kristin Hickman and Kathryn
Watts, have suggested a narrower set of factors for determining con46
gressional intent to authorize an agency to act with the force of law.
They would abandon inquiries about statutory required procedures,
the number of officials authorized to make a decision, and Skidmoretype factors such as the care the agency manifested in making its interpretation when determining whether Chevron deference is warranted. 47 Instead, they argue that Chevron should apply whenever the
agency acts pursuant to a statutory authorization to make decisions
that bind the public to the agency interpretation of the statute.48 For
Merrill, that includes only agency actions that are independently
enforceable, such as legislative rules and orders whose violation can
result in fines without the agency having to go to court for an order
49
enforcing the agency action.
Merrill avoids the need to look at factors that cannot reflect congressional intent. But he does so by substituting intent to authorize
the agency to act with the force of law for intent to grant the agency
interpretive primacy to resolve ambiguities and gaps in the statute,
and the two intents do not necessarily coincide. Merrill understands
that they are not synonymous and addresses why one intent should
imply the other. Many of Merrill's arguments are pragmaticexplaining that his test has sufficient definitive quality to guide courts
and agencies, that it depends on Congress having given the agency
authority in its authorizing statute, and that it will lead to outcomes in
most cases that coincide with the outcomes the courts have reached
under the Chevron doctrine prior to the publication of his article.
Such pragmatic arguments may be well and good as a normative matter, but they are not relevant to the positive question of whether Con46 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 872--82; Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Forceof Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 467, 480-81 (2002).
47 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 854-56.
48 See id. at 875-87.
49 See id. at 884.
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gress actually provided the basis for courts deferring to agencies on
questions of law.
Merrill and his coauthors do present one argument that squarely
addresses the positive question. They contend that in acting with the
force of law, agencies necessarily must resolve gaps and ambiguities in
their authorizing statutes. 50 Furthermore, they note that Congress
expects that most agency interpretations will not be reviewed, and
therefore leaving gaps and ambiguities in statutes cannot have meant
to provide for judicial interpretive primacy.5 1 Hence, when Congress
passes a statute that is silent or ambiguous on a particular question
and has authorized an agency to act with the force of law to implement that statute, Congress has delegated the resolution of that question to the agency.
The problem is that Merrill's conclusion does not follow from the
premises. Congress may have authorized an agency to act with the
force of law under an ambiguous statute for reasons entirely unrelated
to granting the agency interpretive primacy. 52 Congress may have

done so because it wanted the agency to address the issue first, in the
process using its potentially superior fact-finding ability and technical
knowledge about the likely consequences of a particular statutory
interpretation to inform the courts on the issue should the agency
decision be challenged. Congress may simply have seen the agency as
a pragmatic means of holding hearings to develop evidence to inform
the interpretation, thereby avoiding having to increase the number of
Article III trial court judges. To undermine Merrill's connection
between authority to act with the force of law and interpretive primacy, one need only recognize that trial judges act with what Merrill
characterizes as "force of law" when issuing their decisions, that decisions by trial courts often are not appealed, and yet when appealed
lower court interpretations of law are reviewed de novo, with no deference at all.
In a similar vein to Merrill, John Duffy has proposed that Chevron
applies only to legislative rules, which have the same legal impact on
the public as statutes.53 Duffy's formulation avoids the problematic
analogy between agency interpretations and those of trial courts. In
50 Merrill and Hickman borrow this part of their argument from John Duffy, see
id. at 877 n.232 (citing Duffy, supra note 17, at 199-202), whose variation on the force
of law criteria I address infra note 53 and accompanying text.
51 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 878.
52 Merrill and Hickman essentially recognize this problem, but claim to surmount it by observing that Congress recognizes that in many cases the agency decision will not be challenged, and hence its interpretation will stand. See id.
53 See Duffy, supra note 17, at 199-203.
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addition, when Congress gives an agency authority to adopt a legislative rule, the agency essentially has authority to enact law. Thus, even
if a statute did not clearly provide the interpretation given to it by the
agency, the agency can simply adopt a rule implementing that interpretation. Such a rule has the same effect on the public as would a
statutory amendment by Congress. Hence, it seems plausible to
assume that by granting rulemaking power to an agency, Congress
deputized that agency as a junior legislature to fill statutory gaps and
resolve statutory ambiguities in the stead of Congress itself.
Duffy's formulation mirrors an argument of Henry Monaghan
that because Congress can delegate to an agency the authority to
adopt regulations that have the force of law, it necessarily follows that
54
it can delegate to the agency leeway to interpret statutory language.
According to Monaghan, " 'interpretation'of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency."55 Even when

Congress passes a statute that delegates lawmaking authority, however,
the statute simultaneously limits the agency authority, requiring that
the agency stay within the bounds set out by that statute. Duffy's formulation, like the argument of Monaghan, fails to face squarely that
statutes simultaneously may have been intended to authorize agencies
to act and to limit the bounds of such action. Especially in a politically
complex world, in which Congress may by necessity have to delegate
broadly to agencies, but in which Congress is wary of accretion of
power by the executive branch, 56 it is possible that Congress would

intend that the independent judiciary actively determine the bounds
of agency discretion even where the words of the statute are insufficient to clearly define those bounds.
The fundamental problem with both Merrill's and Duffy's inferences-that statutory ambiguity along with authorization for agencies
to act with force of law evidences intent to grant agencies interpretive
primacy-is that they depend on an oversimplified set of choices for
legislative intent. They both posit that the legislature had intent
about vesting interpretive primacy either in the agency and the court,
and argue that their respective criteria make the former choice more
likely. But their conclusions do not follow once one recognizes that
54

See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 26.

55

Id.

56 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 156-57 (1999)
(reporting a greater likelihood of delegation to federal agencies rather than other
institutions when the President and Congress are controlled by the same party); Sidney A. Shapiro, PoliticalOversight and the Deteriorationof Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1, 15-19 (1994) (discussing the competition between Congress and the executive
branch to control the administrative state).
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the legislature has more options than simply preferring agencies or
courts.
First, it is not only possible, but in most instances quite likely that
Congress simply has no intent about which institution enjoys interpretive primacy over any particular issue. Because Merrill and Duffy rely
on an affirmative congressional intent to override the explicit provision of the APA granting interpretive primacy to courts, 5 7 on judicial
review, a simple lack of intent is not sufficient to support their justification for invoking Chevron.
Even where Congress has intent about interpretive primacy, that
intent may be more complex than simply preferring one institution
over another. For any statute, the interpretation of which may raise a
multitude of issues, it is possible that for resolution of some issues
Congress preferred agencies over courts but for other issues preferred
courts over agencies.5 8 It is even possible for such mixed intent to
apply to two issues raised by the very same textual provision of a single
statute.
This possibility is illustrated by the famous pair of pre- Chevron
cases, construing the word "employee" in the National Labor Relations Act. 59 In the first case, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,60 the
Supreme Court addressed the National Labor Relations Board's determination that "newsboys" were employees of the publishers of the
newspapers they sold, rather than independent contractors, and
therefore were entitled to protection under the Act. 61 The factors

that distinguish employees from independent contractors are many,
and these factors vary from one employer to another. For this reason
the, Court characterized the issue as one of application of law to fact
and reviewed the agency decision deferentially, demanding only that
the agency decision have "'warrant in the record' and a reasonable
63
basis in law." 62 In the second case, Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
the Court addressed the question of whether foremen on an automobile assembly line were employees rather than managers, and there57

See Duffy, supra note 17, at 158-59; Merrill & Watts, supra note 46, at 479-80.

58 See Garrett, supra note 12, at 2644 (raising questions about the accuracy of any
presumption about congressional intent regarding whether courts or agencies should
fill particular gaps in statutes).
59 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (DEFINING THE TERM "EMPLOYEE" AS USED IN THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT).
60 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
61 See id. at 130-31.
62 Id. at 131.
63 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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fore entitled to statutory protection. 64 The Court characterized this
issue as a "naked question of law" and gave no deference to the Board
regarding its resolution. 65 The two cases led to two distinct lines of
precedent for review of an agency action that reflected an 6interpreta6
tion of the exact same provision of its authorizing statute.
A defense of the Hearst-Packarddistinction hinges on the differing
likelihood that Congress expected the statute to constrain the NLRB
regarding the respective issues in the cases.6 7 The Act's coverage of
line foremen would affect virtually all major manufacturing plants and
unions in the country, and given the fundamental impact of the issue,
defenders of Packard contend that it was reasonable to presume that
Congress intended the courts to check the agency discretion in determining such coverage by interpreting the statute themselves. The
issue of whether a newsboy was an employee, however, was unlikely to
have broad effects, and the Court was reasonable in reading the statute as not imposing significant constraints on the agency discretion to
make this determination. 68 In short, Hearst and Packardas a pair can
be justified only by recognizing that Congress had different intent
about interpretive primacy with respect to whether the term employee
under the Act included newsboys, than it did with respect to whether
the term included line foremen. 69
64 See id. at 486-88.
65 Id. at 493.
66 There are reasons to believe that the Court in Chevron actually thought it was
following the Hearst line of cases and not significantly changing the doctrine by which
courts review agency interpretations of their authorizing statutes. Chevron was unanimous and the opinion reads as if the doctrine it states was firmly established and not

controversial. Moreover, Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion in Chevron, later tried
to interpret that opinion as applying only to agency application of law to facts, which
is the realm of Hearst. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see also Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"?Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 46-49 (1995) (describing Justice Scalia's vociferous objection to the

narrow reading Justice Stevens gave to Chevron in Cardoza-Fonseca).
67 See Breyer, supra note 12, at 371.
68 See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv.

1093, 1120 (1987). The issue of whether the statute adopted the common law definition of employee was also raised in Hearst,and this issue would have significant impact
beyond the case, essentially barring all common law independent contractors from
the protections of the Act. The Court treated this issue as one of law, and while
agreeing with the agency interpretation, did not rely on any deference to that interpretation in resolving the issue. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
120-24 (1944).

69

Dan Gifford recently advocated that the Court return to something akin to the

Hearst-Packard distinction to determining Chevron's applicability, relying on the

assumption that for issues of great importance, Congress would intend to have the
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The key, therefore, to understanding the relationship between
statutory-provided authority of an agency to speak with the force of
law and congressional intent about the interpretive role of the agency
is to recognize that Congress authorized the agency to exercise that
authority only within the bounds permitted by the statute, and there is
no reason to believe that Congress thereby gave authority to the
agency to determine those bounds. One can read authority to act
with the force of law as implying a designation of interpretive primacy
only if one engages in the semantic sleight of hand of equating creating policy within the bounds of the statute with resolving gaps and
ambiguities in the statute. But they are not the same. Filling in gaps
and clarifying ambiguities means resolving issues about what the statute requires and prohibits, while creating policy-based rules means
adding legal requirements that neither permit what the statute prohibits nor prohibit what the statute requires. In short, agency authority to act with the force of law justifies only a vacuous variation of
Chevron-a variation that would leave the determination of all legal
questions to the courts, telling a court not to strike down an action

that it independently determined was consistent with the agency's
70
authorizing statute.
II.

ARTICLE

III

AS THE FOUNDATION FOR CHEVRON

Given the lack of satisfactory support either for the proposition
that Congress actually intended to mandate the Chevron doctrine, I
courts constrain agency interpretations. See DanielJ. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of
a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, JudicialJudgment, and Administrative

Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 811-17 (2007). Gifford claims that Justice Breyer's
opinion in Barnhartis best understood as a move toward that approach. See id. While
Gifford should be lauded for recognizing the likelihood that Congress has complex
intent with respect to interpretive primacy, his approach would apply Chevron precisely for those issues likely to fall under Congress's radar, and hence where Congress
likely had no intent about such primacy. Moreover, because Congress has more influence over agencies than courts, one might surmise that it would be more apt to delegate interpretive authority to agencies for important matters. Cf David Epstein &
Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political
Science Approach, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 947, 965-66 (1999) (modeling legislative delegation based on the costs of delegating relative to the costs of determining the matter

legislatively).
70 Interestingly, despite Justice Scalia noting that such a view of deference would
destroy the significance of Chevron, see Scalia, supranote 19, at 520, his application of
Chevron is not much more significant given that, as he phrases it, "[o]ne who finds
more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement

for Chevron deference exists." Id. at 521.
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am left to look elsewhere for a justification for the judiciary to shortchange its responsibility to determine the meaning of a statute. I find
authority for the judiciary to invoke Chevron in the structure of the
Constitution, especially its separation of powers into three branches
71
and its assignment of the judicial power to the courts.
A.

Article III as a Basis for Mandatory Chevron Deference

In addition to specifying the judicial power, Article III "define [s]
the role assigned to the [federal] judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power" to ensure that "federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 72 Implicit in Article
III's assignment of the judicial power is the premise that political powers, being extrajudicial, belong to the other branches of government,
and that the judiciary therefore should avoid interfering with those
branches' exercise of their powers where such interference would
73
require the courts to exercise the outer bounds of judicial power.
This policy-interference avoidance principle translates into a court
refraining from second guessing a decision by a political branch when
doing so will require the court to rely heavily on policy. Such a selflimiting principle grounded in Article III is consistent with other wellestablished doctrines of deference. ChiefJustice Marshall, in Marbury,
recognized such a principle when he stated that when the acts of an
executive branch officer reflect discretion left to the officer by the law,
"there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The
subjects are political... The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can
never be examinable by the courts. ' 74 The Court has further developed this limitation on Article III's assignment of the judicial power
under its political question doctrine, which in relevant part requires
that a court refrain from deciding a case within its jurisdiction when
71 Cf Manning, supra note 12, at 626, 633-34 (concluding that the lack of any
real congressional intent regarding Chevron implies that the doctrine has its basis in
"constitutional commitments to electoral accountability").
72 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976) (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The limiting
aspects of Article III are most evident in its requirement that courts decide only cases
and controversies under such doctrines as standing, ripeness, and mootness. See
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers,
17 SuroLK U. L. REv. 881, 883 (1983) (describing judicial concern about courts
intruding into the operation of the political branches); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and
the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1474-75 (1988).
73 Article III's limit on the courts' interpretive endeavors "[p]erhaps... is better
stated .. .as the absence of a judicial right to upset a political choice." Kmiec, supra
note 12, at 277.
74 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
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the court is faced with "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
75
discretion."
Other scholars have justified Chevron based on a separation of
powers rationale of having the politically accountable executive agencies rather than courts make policy decisions. 76 My Article III formulation, however, more accurately reflects the modern recognition that
interpretation, in hard cases at least, cannot be reduced to a valueneutral exercise and hence neatly separated from politics. For that
reason, my proposed foundation for Chevron, while grounded in Article III, is a resistance norm and not an outright ban on judicial policymaking in the process of statutory interpretation.
I am not the first to propose a soft constitutional norm as the
foundation of Chevron.7 7 John Manning's view of Chevron as a canon
of interpretation meant to protect the Constitution's structural commitment to having policy decisions made by electorally accountable
officials operates as such a norm. 78 At the most general level, Manning's version works similarly to my Article III foundation for Chevron
in that it allows judges to be influenced by policy considerations for
statutory interpretation generally, while demanding that courts not
second guess policy determinations when reviewing agency interpretations. But Manning's version differs from my proposed foundation in
several fundamental respects.
First, it grounds Chevron in the accountability of the executive
branch, and implies that Article II validates agency authority to
address issues that Congress has not resolved when the agency acts
75 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Others have drawn the analogy
between Chevron deference and deference to political decisions that flow from the
political question doctrine. See, e.g., David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial
Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 359 (2000) (distinguishing

political question deference as involving matters of the propriety of any judicial determination rather than the grounds for a determination). The analogy, while helpful,
is limited in value because, unlike deference under justiciability doctrines, Chevron
retains a potentially active role for the court in overseeing the executive branch's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 707 (2000) (noting that "Chevron deference is not
absolute 'political question' deference").
76

See Kmiec, supra note 12, at 278; Pierce, supra note 12, at 2229-30, 2232-33

(1997). These scholars, however, neither tied their arguments specifically to the
bounds of Article III or any particular structure of the Constitution, nor addressed the
extent to which courts can make policy as part of the judicial power.
77
78

See Manning, supra note 12, at 633-34.
See id.
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within its statutory authority. 79 Thus, Manning's view leaves little
room for the Court to provide the parameters for when the Chevron
doctrine should apply and when it should not. If the agency interprets a statute as part of any action within its statutorily prescribed
authority to administer the law, Manning's Chevron applies.
Second, operationally Manning connects the Article II authority
of the President to Chevron via a presumption that Congress intended
to prefer agencies over courts for resolution of policy matters.8 0 As
such, it accepts that actual congressional intent, where discernible,
will control the extent to which courts must defer to agency interpretation. Thus, it differs from the Article III foundation in that it recognizes unfettered legislative discretion to remove the courts entirely
from the interpretive process when reviewing agency action so long as
Congress does so explicitly. For example, under Manning's view of
the foundation of Chevron, Congress could enact a statute requiring
courts to accept an agency's own determination that any action the
agency took was within the statutory authority granted by its enabling
act. In fact, under his view of the foundation of Chevron, he cannot
explain why the court gets to determine in the first instance whether
the statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, given that this
determination often involves considerations of policy.8 1 My formulation explicitly reserves the question of whether Congress could eliminate the judiciary totally from the interpretive process while otherwise
82
granting the court jurisdiction to review agency action.
Third, Manning unmoors Chevron from judicial responsibility to
interpret the law. He does so by artificially distinguishing between
policy and interpretation. Although Manning recognizes that interpretation often involves policy decisions, he posits that the two
endeavors are separable, and assigns the former to the executive
branch and the latter to the courts when Congress has not spoken on

79 See id. at 617.
80 See id. at 634. Essentially, Manning provides a constitutional justification for
Scalia's view of Chevron as stemming from a presumed congressional intent.
81 The same criticism applies to Sunstein's view that Chevron reflects a principle
that key policy judgments should be made by policymaking officials. See Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 2598.
82 In this Article, I refrain from addressing whether the Constitution restricts
Congress's power to dictate how courts should perform their interpretive tasks,
although my intuitions are that the Constitution provides some bounds on this power.
See supra note 9. By relying on presumed congressional intent, Manning's view
accepts that Article III does not limit Congress's power to dictate interpretive methodology to the courts.
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the precise issue.8 3 As such, Manning's approach provides little
insight into potential constitutional restrictions on how Chevron might
work at steps one and two.
For me, although step one is a matter of interpretation and
hence is left primarily to the courts, it can constrain executive policy
on a basis not clearly set out in a statute. Hence, an Article III
grounded noninterference doctrine would support some judicial selflimitation at step one. Analogously, although step two is a matter of
policy and left primarily to agencies, I recognize that it can affect the
bounds of what interpretations are reasonable. Hence, unlike Manning, my Article III foundation leaves room for the court to be
involved in overseeing step two of Chevron.
In short, the neat distinction Manning makes precludes his theory from providing guidance about the extent and type of uncertainty
courts may tolerate at step one, and the role of courts in policing
agency determinations at step two. My reliance on Article III as the
foundation of Chevron allows me to consider such guidance.
The Article III foundation still leaves room for Congress to influence Chevron deference. Chevron is a doctrine of judicial self-restraint
and, being a soft norm, its assignment of interpretive primacy to agencies is not constitutionally demanded. Because the doctrine protects
the political branches' prerogatives, there may be room for those
branches to relieve the self-imposed restraint by statute. In particular,
84
Article III does not affect Congress's control over agency authority.
Therefore, my understanding of Chevron does not prohibit Congress
from taking interpretive primacy from agencies and giving it back to
the courts.8 5 Congress can do so simply by restricting the authority of
83 Manning posits a presumption that when Congress has authorized agencies to
act, the Constitution presumes that policy decisions that arise in the interpretive process are to be made by agencies. See Manning, supra note 12, at 634.
84 Congressional control over agency authority stems from its explicit Section 8
powers, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, but may be
limited by the constitutional mandate that Congress not circumvent bicameralism
and presentment. See Manning, supra note 12, at 652 -53; see also Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 573, 597-99 (1984) (noting that any significant constitutional power to alter the
shape of the federal government falls to Congress's power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
85 Nonetheless, unlike others who have recently considered the question of Congress's ability to prescribe statutory interpretive directives, see Rosenkranz, supra note
10, at 2140, I entertain the possibility that statutory interpretation involves a judicial
function implicit in Article III's vesting of the judicial power in the courts. Accord
Jellum, supra note 10, at 867-70. Hence, I am open-minded to the possibility that
there are limits on Congress's ability to prescribe how courts are to interpret statutes,
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the agency that administers a statute from providing controlling interpretations of that statute, thereby returning all statutory responsibility
to the judiciary.8 6 Alternatively, Congress could take the lesser step of
changing agency authority to interpret its authorizing statute by
requiring the agency to acquiesce in an independent judicial interpretation of the statute.8 7 In short, by exercising its statutory control over
agency authority, Congress can limit the applicability or deference of
the Chevron doctrine, but Congress cannot expand that applicability
or deference.
To flesh out the influence of Article III on judicial review of an
agency statutory interpretation, I begin by postulating that when legitimate factors lead to several plausible readings of the statute, the prospect is great that a reviewing judge will resort to preferences about
contested policy matters. 88 Such preferences may be about the particular outcome of the precise interpretive issue, such as whether some
particular conduct is subject to regulation. Alternatively, they may be
about broader approaches to regulation, such as a belief that government should refrain from supplanting market mechanisms. 89 The
basic insight behind my postulate is that because interpretation of an
even if such prescriptions demand less judicial deference to agency interpretations.
My intuition suggests that there is such a limit. I am troubled, for example, by a
statute that would preclude a court from giving even Skidmore deference to an agency
interpretation. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Such a statute
would limit the court from informing itself as it sees necessary on an interpretive issue
for which the courts are responsible for issuing an interpretation with the power to
control, not just persuade. See id. at 139-40.
86 Those who see Chevron as limited only by nondelegation principles run into
problems explaining why a statute that gives too little guidance to allow deference to
an agency to exercise interpretive primacy is not unconstitutionally vague when it
grants that same deference to a court. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate:
Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 405,
428-29 (2008) (pointing out that vague statutes that do not call for agency interpretation essentially delegate policymaking to the courts).
87 This would essentially overrule National Cable & Telecommunications Association
v. Brand Xlnternet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 984-85 (2005), which provides that an agency
may ignore prior judicial interpretation of a statute where the courts determine that
the interpretation resolved a statutory ambiguity rather than reflected a determination of statutory meaning.
88 This postulate is consistent with findings that judges' decisions whether to find
statutes sufficiently unclear tojustify deferring to an agency interpretation correlates
with the ideological preferences of the judges. See Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J.
Miles, DepoliticizingAdministrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2201-09 (2009).
89 Judges may have preferences about approaches to administrative law, such as a
belief that agencies should not be afforded deference for interpretations that are in
their immediate interest. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency
Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 208-10 (2004).
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ambiguous statute is not an objectively verifiable endeavor-because
there is no demonstrably right or wrong interpretation-a judge has
significant leeway to hide a policy-driven decision behind an evaluation of seemingly noncontestable factors. A judge may even fool herself into believing that her interpretation is not value laden when
subconsciously she may be weighing the relevant interpretive factors
to support her preferred interpretation. 90 As Justice Scalia has stated,
"Where the courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do
enforce upon the executive branch adherence to legislative policies
that the political process itself would not enforce, they are likely
(despite the best of intentions) to be enforcing the political
prejudices of their own class." 9 1 Thus, at its heart, my foundation for
Chevron is a self-imposed judicial restraint to avoid taking the primary
role in interpreting statutes when accepting that role creates a significant potential for a judge, either consciously or not, to impose an
interpretation that furthers her policy preferences.
B.

The Rationale of the Chevron Opinion

One possible critique of my Article III bases for the Chevron doctrine is that the Chevron Court never mentioned Article III in its opinion. Technically, this is correct. The Chevron Court, however, simply
did not address the constitutional foundation for its holding.92 Given
that there must be such a foundation, the endeavor in discerning it
should not hinge on some mystical reading of the tea leaves of the
United States Reports to discern a hidden intent of the Justices, but
rather to lay out a theory that most comfortably supports the doctrine
that the Court created and the rationales that the Court gave for it.
The rationale of the Chevron opinion is more consistent with the
separation of powers foundation than with one based on statutory pre90 The psychological theory of cognitive dissonance supports the likelihood that a
judge will use her interpretive discretion to reduce dissonance between her values
and the outcome of her interpretive decision. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 18-19 (1957).
91 Scalia, supra note 72, at 896 (arguing that the constitutional standing requirement of Article III prevents unwarranted judicial intrusion into the execution of the
law).
92 Given the uncontroversial nature of the Chevron opinion, it is likely that the
Supreme Court never intended Chevron to be a major extension of prior case law
changing the relationship of reviewing courts and agencies with respect to statutory
interpretation. This is also supported by Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, suggesting in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987), that Chevron deference
is appropriate only when an agency applies law to facts and when it engages in pure
statutory interpretation.
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scription. The Court noted that the reason Congress left an issue
unresolved by statute was not relevant to the invocation of the deference doctrine it announced. 95 Instead, the Court emphasized that
once the statute was determined to be silent or ambiguous, resolution
of the interpretive question depended on policy judgments, and that
agencies are more qualified than courts to render such judgments on
account of both superior expertise and accountability. 94 Nor can one
contend that the Court's emphasis on the fact that Congress chose to
leave the statute silent or ambiguous with respect to the interpretive
issue at hand implies some sort of statutory assignment of interpretive
primacy to the agency. As I have already made clear, inferring such
an assignment conflates intent about particular meaning of the statute
with intent about which institution shall resolve any uncertainty in
95
meaning.
C.

Separation of Powers as a Restriction on Judicial Consideration of
Policy

A second possible critique of separation of powers as the foundation for Chevron hinges on the fact that outside of the context of
reviewing interpretations by administrative agencies, courts necessarily resolve statutory ambiguities and fill statutory gaps, and in doing
so rely on policy.9 6 Of course, Article III and separation of powers
97
apply outside the administrative law context as well as within it.
Given that these principles do not prevent a court from engaging in
such policy evaluations when they construe statutes independently,
the critique proceeds, they cannot do so in the context of judicial
review.9 8

This critique would have purchase were the constitutional principle that I propose a firm barrier to judicial action rather than a resistance norm. 99 As a norm, however, it only demands that a judge
93 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
94 Id.
95 See supra notes 40, 45-51 and accompanying text.
96 See Lemos, supra note 86, at 429 (stating that "[a]lthough Chevron was concerned with statutory implementation by administrative agencies, there is no good
reason to think that courts are not cast into the same policy-making role when Congress chooses them as its delegates"); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2591 -92 (noting the
Legal Realist critique of judicial statutory interpretation as policy laden).
97 See U.S. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2.
98 See Scalia, supra note 19, at 515.
99 On the use of resistance norms of interpretation generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 331-32 (2000); Young, supra note
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refrain from exercising primary responsibility for interpreting a statute when there is an alternative institution available to exercise such
responsibility that is better suited to make decisions that are likely to
be influenced by value judgments.
Significantly, the constitutional norm justifying Chevron deference does not demand that judges refrain from reliance on policy
based interpretive factors and use only legal factors when reviewing
agency interpretations of statutes.10 0 I have already noted that in hard
cases it will likely be impossible to separate legal from policy considerations. Moreover, doing so is likely to lead to bad interpretations. For
example, such a demand would prevent a court from avoiding an
interpretation that flows from the most direct reading of the language
of a statute but which leads to a universally recognized undesirable
effect. 01' Rather, the norm I have proposed allows the judge to use all
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.1 0 2 If after doing so,
however, the judge recognizes that the interpretation she reaches is
not the only plausible one-that the statute is amenable to a range of
reasonable interpretations-then the judge would defer to an agency
interpretation made in a context that makes the agency a better institution for resolving contested policy matters.
D. Chevron asJudicial Self-Constraint
Chevron as a constitutional resistance norm meant to implement
Article III principles is unlike other resistance norms in that it is
8, at 1552, coining the term. See also John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation
Canon, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1542 n.7 (2008) (tyingYoung's resistance norms
to Sunstein's nondelegation canons).
100 By "legal factors" I mean those that do not explicitly rely on the desirability of
the outcome of the interpretation or a preferred vision of how government should
operate. They include the meaning of a particular word, the impact of statutory
structure, and consistency with precedent. Policyfactors are those that are outside
this definition and include evaluation of the probability or desirability of impacts of
the interpretation and on the nonlinguistic canons of interpretation such as the
avoidance canon.
101 In such situations courts frequently reject plain meaning of statutory text in
favor of a possible but less natural reading to avoid absurd results. See United States v.
Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 47 n.5 (1994) (rejecting the plain meaning of the statute
because it would lead to an absurd result); id. at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(agreeing that courts should reject statutory clear meaning when it leads to absurd
results); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897) ("[N]othing is better settled than
that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.").
102 As such, the norm is consistent with current judicial practice at step one. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (holding that at step one of Chevron
courts are to employ the traditional tools of statutory interpretation).
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imposed by the Court as a self-restraint on the judiciary, rather than
imposed as a restraint on another branch of government. The argument that Chevron derives from Article III thus depends on Chevron
actually being a limitation on courts rather than a hidden power grab
by them.
The concern that Chevron is an assertion rather than a limitation
ofjudicial power stems from the Court having determined which institution, court or agency, gets to exercise interpretive primacy. According to John Duffy, this is a greater and more dangerous assertion of
power than had the Court merely assumed its interpretive responsibility in a particular case.10 3 There is some intuitive appeal to Duffy's
argument: the power to mold the institutional arrangements of government-the power to decide who decides-occurs at a metalevel
and is constitutional in nature.' 0 4 This power therefore seems more
fundamental than the mere power to interpret an individual statute.
The argument, however, is flawed. Had the Chevron doctrine
involved the courts deciding which of two nonjudicial institutions gets
to interpret statutes, it would be a significant exercise of power over
institutional arrangements that would dwarf the power merely to
interpret a particular statute. But Chevron involves a choice between
the courts retaining interpretive primacy or assigning that role to
agencies. Thus, although the choice occurs at a metalevel, because
the choice involves forfeit of a power that otherwise would reside in
the judiciary, it ultimately restrains the courts from being able to exercise discretion. It is the resolution of particular statutory issues that
leads to outcomes that judges may or may not prefer.10 5 If the judge
has discretion to choose among interpretations when faced with an
ambiguous statute, she can always choose her preferred outcome. By
103
104

See Duffy, supra note 17, at 193-99.
See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445-46 (1998) (stating that Congress

cannot assign the President the authority to repeal statutes without amending the
Constitution).
105 In this discussion, I assume that judges are influenced by preferences about
particular policy outcomes but can be constrained by law and institutional structures.
See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 503 (1996)
(describing Legal Realists' position that the indeterminacy of law allows judges to
pursue policy preferences). Of course,judges also react to other preferences, such as
about how the legal system should operate and even whether a decision will enhance
their reputation as a judge. See Richard A. Posner, What DoJudges andJustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 15 (1993). To the
extent that judges forfeit discretion to decide some matters of statutory interpretation, Chevron will interfere with judges' ability to pursue such other preferences as
well, unless ajudge simply has a preference for allowing the executive branch to make

such decisions.
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demanding that judges cede some of this discretion to agencies, Chevron constrains the ability of the judges to choose preferred outcomes.
And this remains true even if judges retain significant discretion over
whether a statute is sufficiently unclear on particular issues of statutory interpretation to warrant reaching step two of Chevron.
This response to Duffy does not preclude Chevron from being an
assertion of power by the Supreme Court Justices. There are hundreds of cases in which lower courts review agency statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court could not grant certiorari on all of
them to ensure that the outcome in each case was in line with the
Justices' preferences. 10 6 Lower courtjudges may have different policy
preferences from those that would be supported by a majority of
Supreme Court Justices. Hence, Chevron can be seen as a power grab
by the Supreme Court if the preferences of agency officials are more
likely than those of lower court judges to line up with the policy preferences of the Supreme CourtJustices. But, the predicates to viewing
Chevron as an extraordinary assertion of power by the Justices are just
as likely to be untrue as true, given the long-lived nature of the Chevron doctrine and the fact that the policy views of agencies and lower
court judges will change over time in ways that are not predictable.
Furthermore, at least on its face, Chevron constrains the Justices themselves in cases where the Court reviews agency interpretations of statutes.' 0 7 Hence, the assertion that Chevron was a power grab by the
Supreme Court is difficult to maintain. Moreover, even if one could
maintain the assertion, it would not undermine that, as applied to the
entire judicial branch, Chevron is a constraint.
A final possible critique of viewing Chevron as a self-imposed resistance norm stems from the potential for the doctrine to allow judges
to avoid blame for interpreting statutes based on their personal policy
preferences. 10 8 The critique proceeds as follows: Under Chevron,
106

Chevron enables the Supreme Court to constrain lower courts' interpretive dis-

cretion while deciding only a small number of cases a year. See Strauss, supra note 68,
at 1117-19.
107 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982-83 (2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 -22 (2002).
108 The potential for such a "passive aggressive" use of judicial doctrine to allow
courts to implement their policy preferences by declining to decide an issue is not
unique to the invocation of Chevron. The problem arises whenever the court has discretion under existing doctrine to determine that a petitioner fails to meet requirements allowing the court to decide a claim, which occurs frequently in claims seeking
review of agency decisions under the law of standing, finality and ripeness. See, e.g.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559--62 (1992) (suit dismissed for lack of
standing); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1999)
(suit dismissed because the agency action was not final).
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courts have discretion whether to find that a statute resolved the interpretive issue. If ajudge's preferences align with the agency interpretation, she can simply invoke Chevron, thereby hiding that she is really
deciding what the statute means and escaping accountability for that
decision. 10 9 Thus Chevron might encourage a judge to reach a decision consistent with her personal policy preferences in a case where
she would have interpreted the statute differently to avoid blame.1 10
If Chevron does facilitate such blame avoidance, then Chevron may
encourage judges to decide cases based on their personal policy preferences, which would undermine my contention that it is a noninterference norm. The probability that Chevron provides deniability that
will cause ajudge to change her interpretation of a statute, however, is
likely to be small because Chevron deference is triggered only when
the court can maintain that a statute does not clearly resolve the issue
facing the court.II1 In such cases, at step one of Chevron ajudge could
justify an interpretation consistent with her personal preferences
using well accepted tools of statutory construction, and thereby avoid
1 12
serious blame without invoking Chevron.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARTICLE III FOUNDATION FOR CHEVRON

Chevron traditionally has been described as a two-step inquiry: at
step one the court determines whether a statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the particular statutory question facing an agency; at
step two, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court asks whether
the agency interpretation is reasonable.1 13 But, the literature on the
grounding of Chevron has focused on a preliminary question, now
known as Chevron step zero, which asks whether Chevron should apply
109 SeeJacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE LJ.
676, 699-700 (2007).
110 The critique might also point out that, to the extent the judge has discretion to
find clear meaning at step one of Chevron when an agency interpretation is discordant
with her preferences, she forfeits nothing in return for Chevron's enabling her to deny
value-driven decisionmaking.
111 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
112 Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest Proposals
for the Future of EnvironmentalLaw, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 257 (2001) (intimating that
Chevron is valuable for correcting abuses by courts that "imposed their own will on the
law in the guise of interpreting congressional intent").
113 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 VA. L.
REv. 611, 611 (2009). But cf Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597, 597-98 (2009) (arguing that Chevron's formulation artificially divides what is a single inquiry into two steps and advocating that
courts and commentators recognize that the doctrine has only one step).
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to a particular agency interpretation at all. 1 4 Chevron's Article III
foundation, consistent with the other literature on the basis for Chevron deference, has its most direct implication for step zero. The Article III foundation, however, may also imply constraints on how a
reviewing court applies steps one and two.
A.

Chevron's Step Zero

The Article III foundation of Chevron has its most direct effect on
the question of whether Chevron applies at all to agency statutory
interpretation made within various types of agency action. This follows because, as I have noted, the grounding of Chevron's step zero on
legislative intent tautologically limits Chevron's applicability to
whatever intent about interpretive primacy one reads into statutory
authorization of agency action. 115 The Article III foundation moves
the inquiry away from congressional intent, focusing instead on the
relative competence of courts and agencies to resolve the meaning of
ambiguous statutory provisions. 1 16 At the same time, by avoiding
grounding Chevron on the legislature's Article I powers, the Article III
foundation provides leeway for judges to create a more nuanced doctrine of when Chevron applies.
Under my approach, judges should cede primary responsibilities
for interpreting statutes when it is likely both that their interpretation
will be influenced by policy preferences and a superior alternative
interpretive mechanism-agency interpretation-is available.
Whether agency interpretation is likely to be superior is the important
focus for the step zero inquiry. 1 17 Given the lessons of public choice
theory, expertise accompanied by direct political accountability can
be a curse rather than a blessing by increasing the likelihood that an
agency decision reflects the improper influence of focused interest
groups.' 18 Influence is improper when it does not reflect the accommodation of interests that the statutory scheme establishes.
The inquiry into whether the agency interpretation in any context is likely to be superior thus boils down to consideration of
114 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 836; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 208 (2006).
115 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
116 Cf Breyer, supra note 12, at 370 (discussing how pre-Chevron,judicial acceptance of the fiction of congressional intent, on a case-by-case basis, allowed courts to
defer based on their reading of relative competence of courts and agencies to determine the meaning of a statute in a particular context).
117 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-30 (2001).
118 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation,86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230-31 (1986).
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whether the interpreter in the agency has incentives to deviate from
the balance struck by the statute, and whether there are sufficient
accountability mechanisms to prevent the interpreter from doing so.
This in turn will depend on the position of the interpreter in the
agency, and perhaps the procedures used to reach the decision.
Thus, building on an Article III foundation for Chevronjustifies factors
akin to those used in Mead more than does the legislative intent foundation on which that case relied.
Consider whether numerous officials within an agency are
authorized to make the decision which raised the interpretive issue.
When an interpretation is made by a low-level official from a program,
technical, or enforcement office within an agency as part of his day-today functions, the interpretation is likely to reflect the professional
perspective of that official.' 1 9 It is unlikely either to go through a serious vetting process within the agency, 120 or be the focus of congressional or White House attention. 1 2 1 Thus, such an interpretation is
more likely to reflect an idiosyncratic professional perspective than is
one that has been reached after consideration by agency officials with
different professional backgrounds or an interpretation that is sufficiently central to the agency's mission that it will attract attention of
those in the White House or on Capital Hill.
Consider as well the procedures used in making the decision.
Some procedures, such as publication of proposed action in the
12 2
agency annual agenda or issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking,
put those affected on notice that the agency might adopt an interpre119

See DouGLAs YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY 132 (1982) ("ITlhe force of

[guild-like] professionalism [within agency staff] is diminished by conflict among various professional groups over the shape and substance of policy.").
120 See Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption of
State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 611,645 (2010) (contending that rulemaking is less susceptible to capture or idiosyncrasy of values than action of a single person or even from a single office within an agency).
121 The more significant and notorious an agency action, the more likely that
some interest group is going to pull the "fire alarm" by complaining to Congress or
the White House. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. POL. ScI. 165, 166, 172-73
(1984). For the president especially, action of political appointees is more likely to
coincide with the president's preferences than action by professional staff. See Mark
Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80
IOWA L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1994).
122 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (requiring notice-and-comment proceedings for substantive rules); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638-49 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 745-49 (2006) (requiring an agency to include in its regulatory agenda
all regulations under development and review as well as all significantly important
regulatory actions the agency expects to issue).
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tation, provide those affected an opportunity to register their concerns with the agency, and facilitate those affected in alerting
Congress or the White House to the matter. In addition, procedures
may signal self-awareness by an agency official about the significance
of the decision he is making, thereby encouraging him to act less pro1 23
vincially and more deliberatively.
Unlike the implications of viewing Chevron as a matter of legislative intent, the Article III foundation would free courts to consider the
actual decisionmaking process used to generate an interpretation
rather than the legislative mandates for that type of agency action.
For example, if an agency were to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for an interpretive rule issued by the head of an agency, that
would trigger Chevron under my approach; it would not under Mead
because interpretive rules do not carry the force of law, 124 and virtually any agency official can issue an interpretive rule without any mandated procedures. Unlike intentionalist foundations, however, an
approach founded on judicial self-restraint neither depends on the
agency authority to act with the force of law, nor ignores postenactment events, such as the fact that the agency head adopted the
interpretation.
One objection to the implications of the Article III foundation is
that it creates uncertainty about whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies. This criticism, which the dissent in Mead raised, 125 has
even greater potential force with respect to my approach because the
court cannot provide certainty even about which particular types of
agency actions warrant Chevron deference. The applicability of Chev123 In a sense, the formalization of procedure acts as a reminder of the significance of the action the agency is taking. An analogy would be to doctrine of the
Catholic Church under which the Pope must explicitly specify that he is speaking "excathedra" (i.e. metaphorically from the Chair of Saint Peter) when he intends to
invoke infallibility. See Papal Infallibility, ENCYCLOPEDIA BrrANNICA ONLINE, http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/441822/papal-infallibility (last visited Sept. 9,
2010) ("The definition of the first Vatican Council (1869-70), established amid con-

siderable controversy, states the conditions under which a pope may be said to have
spoken infallibly, or ex-cathedra ('from his chair' as supreme teacher). It is prerequisite that the pope intend to demand irrevocable assent from the entire church in
some aspect of faith or morals."). I thank my good friend Walter Kamiat for bringing
this point and the analogy to the ex-cathedra doctrine to my attention.
124 Mead was a generalization of the Court's holding in Christensen v. HarrisCounty,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), denying Chevron's applicability to an interpretation contained in an agency opinion letter, which under the APA is an interpretive rule. See 5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (defining "rule").
125 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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ron under the Article III approach would depend on the particularities of the decision making under review. From the perspective of
encouraging proper agency behavior, however, the value of certainty
about whether Chevron or Skidmore applies is overblown; certainty can
even have perverse impacts on the agency interpretive process. Chevron provides a standard of review, not a standard of conduct for agencies. 126 The purpose of the Chevron doctrine is judicial selflimitation. 12 7 It is not meant to relieve the agency of its duty to carefully consider sources of law or implications of an interpretation
before making it.128 Agency knowledge that its interpretation will be
reviewed under Chevron invites it to be lazy or strategic because it
knows that the interpretation will be upheld so long as it stays within
the often broad bounds allowed by statute. 129 Hence, a little uncertainty on this matter may be a good thing.
The more telling critique of this uncertainty is the leeway it leaves
courts in deciding whether to invoke Chevron. The doctrine may create the appearance ofjudicial restraint while allowing courts to avoid
restraint whenever they please. I am optimistic, however, that just as
other judicially developed standards solidify over time to limit judicial
discretion, decisions about whether Chevron applies will create sufficient precedent to constrain courts' discretion at step zero.
B.

Chevron's Step One

Step one of Chevron raises interesting questions about how active
ajudge should be in determining whether a statute has meaning with
respect to the precise question before the reviewing court. The level
ofjudicial activism inherent in step one represents a sliding scale. On
one end is the position of Justice Scalia, who claims that for him Chevron is not as significant as for other judges because he is apt to find a
126

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66

(1984).
127
128

See id.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 133-34.

129 For example, the Department of Health and Human Services essentially admitted that it did not try to reach the best interpretation for a statute prohibiting federal
funding of abortion, which regrettably the Supreme Court not only upheld but for
which the Court actually complimented the agency. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,

187 (1991); see also Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative
Agencies, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 95, 96 (2010) (modeling agency statutory interpretation to show that the standard of review will affect the aggressiveness of the agency
choice of interpretation); Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 101 -03 (describing this incident of admitted lack of care in interpretation).
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clear meaning.1 30 Essentially, this implies that once a judge finds a
convincing reading of a statute, then the judge should vote for that
meaning, and therefore need never get to step two. A judge would
get to step two only if she remained personally uncertain of the best
meaning of a statute. On the other end of the spectrum would be a
judge who reaches step two even when she is fairly certain of a best
reading if she determines that other judges could reasonably reach a
13
different meaning. 1
Constraints on Chevron's step one do not flow as directly from its
constitutional foundation as do constraints at step zero. In fact,
approaches that ground Chevron on legislative intent say nothing
about how the courts should proceed at step one because they do not
reflect any actual statutory prescription of the relative bounds of
agency and court interpretive authority. 13 2 My approach, however,
does inform the extent to which judges should find a statute silent or
ambiguous because it calls for them to defer to the agency when their
interpretations are likely to be influenced, whether consciously or not,
by their policy preferences.
The set of interpretations for which judges are likely to be so
influenced is substantial because judges, like everyone else, are subject
to attribution errors that will hide, even from themselves, their reliance on personal preferences and perspectives on meaning that stem
from their individual backgrounds and experiences. 133 The potential
for such errors suggests that at step one of Chevronjudges should liberally construe statutes as amenable to multiple interpretations.
Essentially, whenever a judge finds that another reasonable jurist
130 See Scalia, supra note 19, at 521.
131 For a statement of the spectrum of potential approaches to step one, see Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 109, at 688-90.
132 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108-22
(2007) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (criticizing use of legislative history in statutory interpretation at Chevron step one).
133 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE 226-27 (1980) (noting
that people's causal accounts explaining their own behavior are subject to the same
biases as accounts of others' behavior); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NiSBETT, THE PERSON
AND THE SITUATION 79-82 (1991) (noting that when a person tries to explain his or
her own reaction to a situation the mental construal process to do so can lead to
bias); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent
Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 348-49 (2008)
(claiming thatjudges are more apt to attribute behavior to both external and internal
influences, indicating not only that this influence occurs, but also that judges are
aware of it); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of
Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1127-28 (2008) (addressing
claims by the fields of social psychology and social cognition that "humans often are
moved by forces that exist outside of their conscious awareness").
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could disagree with her about statutory meaning that derives from
legitimate sources of interpretation, the opportunity for value judgments to creep into resolution of meaning is substantial. Thus, Article
III's self-limiting principle counsels that a judge should find a statute
silent or ambiguous whenever she determines that other jurists nonetheless might reasonably disagree about statutory meaning.
Scholars have leveled objections about the inherent tension in a
standard that requires ajudge who has determined that there is a best
interpretation to nonetheless recognize that alternative interpretations are reasonable.1 3 4 That said, the standard is neither incoherent
nor impossible to apply. It is no different from appellate standards of
factual review in both administrative and ordinary judicial cases,
which require an appellate court to accept the findings of lower tribunals even when the court might have found otherwise. 1 35 Moreover, I
believe that there are cases that the Supreme Court has decided which
would have come out differently had the Court adopted this liberal
approach to finding permissible meaning at step one of Chevron.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

a6

the majority found

that the seemingly clear words of the statute to cover cigarettes as a
drug delivery device did not warrant reading the statute to give the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco
products.1 3 7 The majority reached that conclusion based on its consideration of several statutes Congress had passed after adopting the
relevant language of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 138, all
of which seem premised on a congressional understanding that the
FDA did not have regulatory authority over tobacco. 139 According to
134 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 109, at 690-91.
135 In appeals from findings made by lower judges, appellate courts generally
accept factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Amanda Peters, The Meaning,
Measure and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. Rsv. 233, 245 (2009).
In appeals from jury findings of fact, and from findings after formal administrative
hearings,judges are to accept the findings of the lower tribunal supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing for substantial evi-

dence review of facts when a determination is required by law to be made after a
formal hearing); Peters, supra, at 245. Not only does the law require that judges
accept findings that they would not have made themselves, but it also attempts to

distinguish between the levels of deference given under these two standards. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 -93 (1951) (specifying the nuances of
review of fact finding under the substantial evidence standard in the APA).
136 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
137 See id. at 125-26.
138 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-399 (2006)).

139

See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 158.
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the majority, despite the language of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) these subsequent enactments manifested a clear congres140
sional vision that the FDA did not have the authority it exercised.
But, one cannot surmise that such an understanding necessarily
expresses a desire to deny the FDA authority if, as the FDA ultimately
proved, the tobacco companies had manipulated their products to
deliver preset levels of nicotine to smokers. Dose manipulation is precisely what brought tobacco products within the textual definition of
drug delivery device, and given that no one outside the industry,
including Congress, was aware of this industry practice, Congress's
understanding logically says nothing about its intent to deny that
authority once the facts were developed. 14 1 In short, the majority
could reject the FDA interpretation as unreasonable only if unreasonable means contrary to what the judges in the majority thought to be
the best reading of the statute.
It warrants mention, that where a difference in statutory interpretation results from disagreement about the legitimacy of sources, the
Article III foundation for Chevron does not suggest that judges must
find the statute silent or ambiguous.142 If a jurist can reach an interpretation only by use of sources of law that another judge considers
illegitimate, then the second judge rightfully can conclude that the
interpretation is unreasonable. 14 3 This seeming exception is not
problematic as long as the judge acts consistently in rejecting that
source. In that case, the judge is not free to pick and choose the
sources of law to reach an interpretation that may reflect an extralegal preference.
140 See id. at 126.
141 As a matter of formal logic, this reflects that the statement P implies Q is true
whenever P is not true. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC
330 (7th ed. 2000). Essentially, by the majority's reading of the statute, Congress
determined that if the tobacco industry did not manipulate the nicotine level delivered by cigarettes then the FDA does not have authority over tobacco products. The
fact that the premise is false means that all bets are off about the truth of the conclusion. Coupled with statutory language under which tobacco products clearly fell
within the definition of drug delivery devices, the agency's interpretation is
reasonable.
142 For a description of the debate on use of one source, legislative history, in
statutory interpretation, see Cheryl Boudreau et al., Wat Statutes Mean: Interpretive
Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957,
981 -91 (2007).
143 This follows only if the choice of sources of law at which a judge may look in
interpreting statutes is a matter to be decided byjudges under their Article III powers.
Under a foundation built on legislative intent, presumably Congress could tell a court
what sources of law are and are not appropriate for use in statutory interpretation.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 10, at 2143-47.

2011]

CHEVRON'S

FOUNDATION

Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education144
reflects different interpretations that stem from a disagreement about
what constitutes a legitimate source of statutory meaning.1 45 The difference between Justice Breyer's majority, which found the statute
ambiguous, and Justice Scalia's dissent, which found it clear, hinged
to a large extent on the legitimacy of legislative history as evidence of
statutory meaning. 146 Scalia refused to consult legislative history
because he believes it is not a permissible source. 14 7 As such, Scalia's
dissent does not likely reflect some hidden policy preference, but
rather his consistent position that legislative history is irrelevant for
determining statutory meaning. To phrase the relationship between
the majority and dissenting opinions another way, Zuni is not a case in
which the dissent would deem the majority to have engaged in reasonable process of interpretation, or vice-versa.
C.

Chevron's Step Two

Courts and commentators have entertained two disparate views of
Chevron's step two. Under the more traditional view, review is cursory,
with the reviewing court affirming an agency interpretation as long as
it falls within the bounds of the silence or ambiguity identified at step
one. 148 Under the alternative view, courts apply more stringent
review, requiring that the agency explain why it chose its interpretation from those allowed by the statutory silence or ambiguity.1 4 9 This
latter view recognizes the agency's policymaking function in filling
statutory gaps, and imposes the same reasoned decisionmaking standard of review at step two as courts demand when reviewing agency
policy choices under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
50
review.'
144 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
145 See id. at 90-91 (finding that the Secretary of Education's interpretation of a
statute was reasonable given its broad language).
146 Compare id. at 100, with id. at 108-10 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that the

Secretary of Education's "implementing regulations do not look much like the
statute").

147

See id. at 109, 121.

148
149

See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 103.
See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CH.-

KENT L. REV. 1253, 1263-66 (1996) (summarizing D.C. Circuit cases in which the
court treated step two of Chevron as a variant on hard look review); M. Elizabeth
Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL AND PoLrTIcAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 99 (John F. Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., 2005).
150 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 44-47
(1983).
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In a recent colloquy, several scholars of administrative law have
151
also debated whether Chevron includes a step two inquiry at all.
This is a separate question than the stringency of the review at step
two, whether it be part of Chevron or something separate. But, as will
become clear, this question bears on the stringency of step-two review.
My grounding of Chevron in Article III has something to say about the
answers to both of these questions.
Let me begin by considering whether Chevron has a step two.
Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule expressed the view that
there is no step two-essentially that step two either is superfluous or
is better viewed as part of traditional review to ensure that agency
action is not arbitrary and capricious.1 5 2 Their view is a natural extension of an article by Gary Lawson noting that, in addition to whatever
Chevron requires, arbitrary and capricious review under the APA also
applies to statutory interpretation. 153 Stephenson and Vermeule
argue that step one is about determining the bounds of allowable
interpretations based on factors that courts normally consult when
interpreting statutes, and that once those bounds are resolved, there
is nothing left for the court to do other than compare those bounds to
what the agency did.154 They characterize what others have called
step two of Chevron simply as an application of arbitrary and capri1 55
cious review to agency statutory interpretation.
Kenneth Bamberger and Peter Strauss have countered asserting
that there is a step two to Chevron.1 56 They characterize Chevron as
dividing the statutory interpretation process into step one, for which
the court is the decisionmaker, and step two, for which the court oversees the agency as the decisionmaker, or in my terms, where the
agency has interpretive primacy.1 5 7 Bamberger and Strauss see the
maintenance of clear areas of responsibility as crucial to keeping
courts out of the policymaking business. 158 They also note that maintaining the distinction between the inquiry for which the court is
responsible and that for which the agency is responsible will help an
151 Compare Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 113, at 597-98 (contending Chevron has only one step), with Bamberger & Strauss, supranote 112, at 611-13 (responding that Chevron has two steps).
152 See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 113, at 599-604.
153 See Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on
Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 1377, 1377-78 (1997).
154 See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 113, at 601 -02.
155 See id. at 603-04.
156 See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 113, at 611.
157 See id. at 613-15.
158 See id. at 615-16.
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agency understand what leeway it has when interpreting a statutory
provision that a court has already considered outside of a Chevron
context.

159

My Article III foundation for Chevron, although premised on
something other than a strict separation of interpretation and policymaking, gives theoretical support to the position of Bamberger and
Strauss. To understand why, consider what step two would be under
Stephenson and Vermeule's view for an issue that fell outside the dictates of the APA, or if Congress amended arbitrary and capricious
review under the APA. I 60 If step two merely invokes the standards of
review that Congress dictates outside of the interpretive context, in
these two situations, there would be no review of reasonableness of
the agency's interpretation. But recall that under my approach to
Chevron, courts voluntarily cede interpretive primacy to the agency
when the agency acts in a manner that is likely to exploit its institutional competence to reach a superior interpretation. 16 1 Given the
courts' ultimate responsibility to say what the law is, however, they
remain responsible to ensure that agencies fulfill that superior institutional potential. Moreover, this responsibility justifies the unique
attributes of statutory interpretation which Bamberger and Strauss
162
In
argue should be encompassed by the judiciary's oversight role.
short, an Article III foundation for Chevron will allow courts to develop
a standard of oversight review for interpretation independent of the
standard that governs agency policymaking discretion under arbitrary
and capricious review.
Having weighed in on whether step two is part of the Chevron
interpretive process, let me now turn to the question of the stringency
of review at that step. At first blush, grounding Chevron on the selfrestraint principle of Article III would seem to preclude the court
from demanding the agency to explain its interpretation. Choosing
interpretations from those allowed by a statute seem more akin to
policymaking than to divinations of statutory meaning. 6 3 A court
that actively reviews agency interpretations to ensure that they are reasoned thus threatens to interfere with the policy-making prerogatives

159
160
aside
161
162
163

See id. at 616-21.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2006) (requiring a court to hold unlawful and set
agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 113, at 622-23.
See Levin, supra note 149, at 1267-68.
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of the agency more directly than does a court that simply defers to
16 4
discretionary choices of statutory meaning.
The potential impact of my Article III grounding, however, is
more nuanced than this intuition would suggest. Recall that the Article III foundation is premised on the agency having institutional
potential, due to its expertise and accountability, to reach a superior
interpretation. Achieving that potential depends on the agency
engaging in a deliberative process that, at a minimum, considers the
implications of plausible interpretations and clarifies the agency's
value judgments in reaching the one it chooses. 165 Judicial demands
to ensure that the agency fulfilled this obligation will vary with the
precise question addressed. Some interpretations will have sufficiently little significance that they warrant abbreviated agency consideration.1 6 6 Even for those that have significant implications, the facts
and reasoning necessary to support the agency choice will depend on
the complexity of the issue and the plausibility of the various interpretive options in light of various interpretive factors such as canons of
interpretation and legislative history.167 Hence, some interpretations
might be reasonable without the agency having considered every
potential aspect of the question, while for others the inquiry required
by full-blown hard look review might be necessary. Most significantly,
under the Article III foundation, the court must review the agency
reasoning process not to satisfy § 706 of the APA, but rather to satisfy
the courts' responsibility over questions of law. That responsibility
can both demand self-restraint and mandate an active role at step two
164 This is one of the critiques of the reasoned decision-making version of arbitrary and capricious review. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games and Accountability, 57 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 185, 200-04, 229-30 (1994); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1400-01 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
JudicialDeterrenceof Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 300-03, 308-13. Much ink
has been spilled about the extent to which hard look review actually interferes with
agency policymaking and whether the benefits of such review are worth the costs of
potential interference. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509-11 (2002) (arguing
that judicial review provides significant benefits in the care agencies give to the rules
they adopt); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique
ofJudicialReview, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 300-02 (2009) (contending that whether judicial review inefficiently discourages agency policymaking depends on many other factors that influence agency decisions to act).
165 See Mark Seidenfeld, supranote 3, at 1549-50; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 129.
166 See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 113, at 622 (doubting that "hard look"
review plays much of a role in review of run-of-the-mill agency adjudications).
167 See id. at 622-23.
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so long as that role is one of agency oversight and not substitution of
judicial value judgments.
It is imperative to understand the difference between oversight
and decision as that difference bears on the requirement that judges
constrain their potential to impose their value judgments. Judicial
oversight involves judgments about the sufficiency of agency consideration of facts and policies that are raised by issues of statutory interpretation. 168 But that is different from judgments about the outcome
of the interpretive question. I do not deny that judges' values may
influence the burden they place on agencies to meet the step two standards. The more ajudge prefers the agency outcome, the more likely
he is to find it reasonable and the less consideration he is likely to
demand of the agency. 169 The key point, however, is that by being
demanding at step two, the judge does not dictate interpretive outcomes. 170 This is best illustrated by the remedy were a court to find an
agency interpretation insufficient at step two. The reviewing court
would remand the case to the agency, which could then seek to reinstate its interpretation after bolstering its factual support and reason17
ing about the issue. 1

CONCLUSION

Despite all that has been written about Chevron, relatively short
shrift has been given to its constitutional foundation, which allows
courts to cede to agencies some responsibility for determining the
meaning of statutes. This is unfortunate, because a careful consideration of that foundation must inform the form that Chevron deference
can assume.
Grounding Chevron in congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies is an unsupportable fiction that distracts
attention from judicial responsibility for the Chevron doctrine.
Instead, Chevron is better viewed as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint
under the courts' Article III responsibilities. That restraint counsels
courts to avoid taking the primary role in interpreting statutes when
that role creates significant potential for a judge to impose her policy
preferences and a superior forum for resolving policy disputes is avail168 See id. at 623.
169 See Posner, supra note 105, at 28.
170 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 130.
171 Cf William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 415-17 (2000) (concluding that hard look
review does not prevent agencies from adopting fundamental regulatory policies).
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able. From this principle it follows that, in deciding whether to apply
the Chevron doctrine, courts should consider the actual decisionmaking process used to generate an agency interpretation rather than the
legislative mandates about whether the agency action has the force of
law. At step one of Chevronjudges should liberally construe statutes as
amenable to multiple interpretations. Finally, at step two, judicial
responsibility to ensure that agencies fulfill the promise stemming
from their superior expertise and accountability justifies courts taking
an active oversight role over agency interpretations of statutes.

